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RECENT DECISIONS 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EXPATRIATION-CRIMINAL DuE PROCESS As PRE-
REQUISITE TO EXPATRIATION \,VHEN IMPOSED AS PUNISHMENT-Respondents, 
native-born Americans, in two separate cases sought declaratory judg-
ments confirming their status as United States citizens. One wanted to 
return to this country, and the other sought to avoid deportation as an 
alien. The Government claimed that respondents had lost their citizenship 
by operation of section 401G) of the Nationality Act of 19401 and its suc-
cessor, section 349(a)(IO) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,2 
which automatically divest an American of his citizenship for "departing 
from or remaining outside the jurisdiction of the United States in time 
of war or . . . national emergency for the purpose of evading or avoiding 
training and service" in the armed forces. Both respondents had remained 
outside the United States during such a period, and one conceded that 
his purpose in doing so was to avoid his military obligations. The statutory 
provisions were held unconstitutional by the federal district courts.3 In 
both cases direct appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, where the cases 
were consolidated for decision. Held, affirmed, four Justices dissenting. 
Congress cannot employ the sanction of expatriation as a punishment with-
out providing for the procedural safeguards required by the fifth and sixth 
amendments. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). 
The Constitution contains no express reference to expatriation, but, 
beginning with an announcement in 1868 that "the right of expatriation 
is a natural and inherent right of all people,"4 Congress has from time to 
time enacted statutes specifying certain types of conduct which will result 
in loss of citizenship.5 Uncertainty arose as to whether Congress was limited 
to the mere enumeration of specific acts which clearly reveal a voluntary 
abandonment or renunciation of citizenship, thereby simply giving sub-
stance to the individual's inherent right of self-expatriation,6 or whether 
Congress's power extended to the effecting of an involuntary forfeiture of 
citizenship where necessary to achieve a legitimate congressional objective. 
This uncertainty was resolved by a five-to-four decision in Perez v. 
Brownell,7 in which it was held that Congress could compel involuntary 
forfeiture of citizenship for voting in a foreign political election.8 The 
1 58 Stat. 746 (added in 1944). 
2 66 Stat. 268, 8 U.S.C. § 148l(a) (10) (1958). 
s Cort v. Herter, 187 F. Supp. 683 (D.D.C. 1960); Mendoza-Martinez v. Rogers, 192 
F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Cal. 1960). 
4 Act of July 27, 1868, REv. STAT. § 1999 (1875). 
5 E.g., formal written renunciation of citizenship, naturalization in a foreign country, 
a woman's marriage to a foreigner (since repealed), and serving in the armed forces of 
a foreign country. 
o No one questions the right to renounce voluntarily or abandon citizenship by 
words or conduct. See, e.g., Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 334 (1939); Perez v. Brownell, 
356 U.S. 44, 48-49 (1958); id. at 66-67 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 
7 356 U.S. 44 (1958). 
8 The four dissenters in the principal case obviously agree with the Perez holding. 
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power as it now exists is; however, subject to a number of limitations, the 
most important of which are those of substantive due process. First, since 
Congress may not act arbitrarily, there must be a "rational nexus" between 
the use of the power of expatriation and the congressional objective sought 
to be achieved.9 The means (expatriation) must be reasonably calculated 
to achieve a legitimate congressional end and thereby designed to further 
the ultimate objective.10 Secondly, it has been held that, even though the 
legislative purpose is legitimate, that purpose cannot be pursued by means 
that broadly stifle "fundamental personal liberties" when there are "less 
drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose."11 As the Court in the 
principal case pointed out, American citizenship is a valuable right, and 
its loss may result in "grave practical consequences."12 Mr. Justice Brennan 
in his concurring opinion referred to expatriation as a "terrifying rem-
edy,''13 and the dissent characterized it a "drastic measure."14 This would 
suggest the appropriateness of limiting the use of involuntary expatriation 
to situations where it provides a unique solution.11• A third limitation is 
that expatriation, as is the case with any other legislative tool, must not, 
under the circumstances, be unreasonable or excessive,16 that is, the con-
gressional end sought must be of sufficient importance to justify the burden 
imposed. Fourth, loss of citizenship may be imposed only as a consequence 
of voluntary conduct,17 not as the result of coercion or duress. This limi-
tation was expressly retained when the Perez decision was handed down,1s 
and it seems to be a link with the past19 which suggests that the Court is 
unwilling to· admit that the power to expatriate is unqualified. 
Assuming that Mr. Justice Brennan, a member of the majority in both Perez and the 
principal case, has not changed his mind, the principal case could be considered a re-
affirmance of Perez. However, in this connection it is interesting to note that in the 
principal case Mr. Justice Brennan mentions that he has some "doubts of the correct-
ness of Perez." Principal case at 187. Add to this the fact that three of the dissenters 
in Perez (the Chief Justice and Justices Black and Douglas) are still on the Court, and 
one may well question the future of Perez. However, at the present time Perez stands. 
9 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 58 (1958). 
10 At present the only clues as to how clear this connection must be are in the Perez 
case (rational nexus with power to regulate foreign affairs existed because expatriation 
for voting in foreign election prevented potential political embarrassment to our gov-
ernment), and in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (expatriation for military desertion 
had no rational nexus with war power). 
11 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); accord, Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. 
NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 296 (1961). 
12 Principal case at 160. 
13 Id. at 187. 
14 Id. at 214. 
15 Mr. Justice Brennan would impose just such a "unique solution" limitation. See 
principal case at 188. 
16 Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330, 347-48 n.5 (1935); Nebbia 
v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934). See also Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 
107 (1877) (Bradley, J., concurring). 
17 Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 133 (1958); Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 
311-12 (1915). 
18 356 U.S. 44, 61 (1958). 
19 In Perez the Court claimed to be following precedent, not making new law. One 
1963] RECENT DECISIONS 1563 
The basis for decision in the principal case-that expatriation when used 
as a punishment cannot constitutionally be imposed except following a 
criminal trial and conviction-now supplies an additional limitation on 
congressional power. The determinative issue of the principal case was 
whether Congress intended expatriation by means of section 4010) pri-
marily as punishment. The majority felt that the legislative history was 
conclusive evidence of a punitive purpose, while the dissent found the pri-
mary purpose to be the boosting of wartime morale by permanent exclusion 
of unpatriotic persons and felt that this was a valid exercise of the war 
power. The available legislative history of section 4010) is brief,20 and no 
specific purpose is expressly stated therein. The majority also relied on 
the purposes of similar statutes passed in 186521 and 1912,22 which the dis-
sent challenged as being irrelevant, noting that section 4010) was "the 
product of a totally different environment-the experience of a nation 
engaged in a global war,"23 and implying that purposes behind identical 
statutes may change with altered circumstances. At any rate, the legisla-
tive history seems to be weak evidence in relation to the judgment it must 
support-a declaration of unconstitutionality.24 
Aside from the relatively narrow issue of legislative history interpreta-
tion, this case is notable for the important constitutional issues that it 
raises but does not decide.25 Assuming the requisite procedural due process 
had been provided, would expatriation be within the powers of Congress 
to apply as a criminal sanction? If Congress had expressed reasons other 
than punitive for inflicting loss of nationality, would expatriation be within 
the powers of Congress as part of a regulatory, as distinguished from a 
prohibitory, scheme? The latter would be aimed at achieving a desired 
result by proscribing a certain act, and the means employed would be a 
criminal sanction, or "punishment," as a deterrent; whereas the former 
would be aimed at achieving a desired result not by prohibiting the act 
but by providing for an adjustment to neutralize the effect of the act if 
it should occur. Such an "adjustment," although it may be a burden, is 
not legally termed a "punishment." Of course regulation in its broader 
sense would include certain ancillary prohibitions, but, since penal and 
of the cases the Court relied on heavily was Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915), in 
which it was said that "a change of citizenship cannot be • • • imposed without the 
concurrence of the citizen." Id. at 311. Thus, retention of the "voluntary conduct" doc-
trine was essential if the Court did not want to overrule Mackenzie. 
20 See H.R. REP, No. 1229, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944); S. REP. No. 1075, 78th Cong., 
2d Sess. (1944); 90 CoNc. REc. 3256-63, 7628-29 (1944). 
21 Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 79, § 21, 13 Stat. 490. 
22 Act of August 22, 1912, ch. 336, 37 Stat. 356. 
23 Principal case at 204. 
24 This seeming willingness to accept equivocal evidence in the face of the "delicate 
task" of constitutional adjudication might possibly be a symptom of a general dissatis-
faction with the doctrine of involuntary expatriation coupled with an unwillingness to 
face the expatriation issue squarely at the present time. See note 8 supra. 
25 Principal case at 186 n.43. 
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non-penal means are subject to different constitutional limitations, it is 
desirable to treat them separately. If expatriation is used as part of a 
regulatory scheme, the "rational nexus" requirement_ would seem to limit 
its use to facilitation of only two congressional powers-the war power or 
the power to regulate foreign affairs. The Perez case is an example of the 
utilization of the device of expatriation as part of a regulatory scheme. 
Although in the regulatory scheme context the procedural requirements of 
the sixth amendment are inapplicable, the procedure provided for the 
protection of individual rights must still comply with the fifth amendment's 
requirement of due process. The fifth amendment guarantees no particular 
form of procedure,26 and procedural due process was not discussed in the 
Perez case. Of course the procedure provided in that case must have been 
sufficient since loss of nationality was upheld. The procedural statute there 
involved27 provided for a suit for a declaration of nationality in a district 
court by anyone denied a right or privilege of citizenship by a govern-
ment agency. This statute has since been replaced by another28 which dif-
fers somewhat in terms. But under recent Supreme Court interpretation,20 
the type of relief available under the Perez statute is still available, and 
thus there should be no procedural due process problem when expatriation 
is used as part of a regulatory scheme.30 
Whether or not Congress can employ expatriation as punishment would 
appear to be an open question. As is suggested in the principal case, ex-
patriation and banishment (the practical result of expatriation in many 
cases) have throughout history been used as punishment.31 In 1800 the 
Court held that "the right to . . . banish, in the case of an offending 
citizen, must belong to every govemment."32 In the principal case the 
question was expressly avoided by the majority,33 and simply not consid-
ered by the dissent. The question has been before the Court only once. 
In Trop v. Dulles,34 decided on the same day as Perez, the Court in a five-
to-four decision denied resort to expatriation when used as punishment 
for desertion from the armed forces. Four Justices, three of whom are still 
on the bench (Warren, Black and Douglas), felt that expatriation as punish-
ment is "cruel and unusual" per se, and thus a violation of the eighth 
amendment. Mr. Justice Brennan concurred in a separate opinion, im-
pliedly rejecting the "cruel and unusual" per se doctrine. The dissent, in 
which Justices Harlan and Clark joined, also rejected the "cruel and un-
usual" per se doctrine, pointing out that, since the death penalty could 
26 NLRB v. :Mackay Radio &: Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 351 (1938). 
27 Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 503, 54 Stat. 1171. 
28 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 360, 66 Stat. 273, 8 U.S.C. § 1503 (1958). 
29 Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367 (1962). 
30 A future congressional attempt to limit this scope of relief might raise constitu• 
tional problems. See Rusk v. Cort, supra note 29, at 380-82 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
31 Principal case at 168 n. 23. 
32 Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14, 20 (1800) (opinion of Cushing, J.). 
33 Principal case at 186 n.43. 
34 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
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have been imposed for desertion, expatriation was not "cruel and unusual." 
Thus, at the present time there are three Justices who would call expatri-
ation employed as punishment a per se violation of the eighth amendment, 
three Justices who would not condemn it as such out of hand, and three 
Justices who have yet to be heard from. Mr. Justice Brennan's concurring 
opinion in Trop laid down a requirement that the penalty must be "ra-
tionally directed to achieve the legitimate ends of punishment,"35 and 
concluded that this requirement had not been met. 
The ends of punishment toward which expatriation might conceivably 
be directed are deterrence, insulation of society from dangerous individuals, 
and retribution. Here one peculiar characteristic of expatriation should 
be noted. Its effects and full ramifications cannot be known in advance. 
The expatriate may become stateless, a situation the consequences of 
which may be very harsh and which in any event cannot be accurately 
predicted. Or he may be a dual national, thereby still retaining the citi-
zenship of another country to which he might be perfectly happy to re-
treat. Or, even if stateless, he might later acquire the citizenship of a 
friendly country. And if expatriation is not coupled with deportation he 
may remain in the United States and continue to enjoy most of the bene-
fits of citizenship. The point is that it is difficult to determine whether 
the penalty is "rationally directed to achieve the legitimate ends of punish-
ment" when it is not known what results the penalty in question will 
achieve.36 Its deterrent effect is most difficult to predict, and the amount 
of retribution may range from slight inconveniences to a forced life of 
wandering as a stateless individual. And only a small part of society (the 
expatriating country) could be insulated from the individual. Even if 
these ends of punishment are to some degree achieved by expatriation, it 
is only in a most haphazard fashion. It seems difficult to say that such an 
inefficient method is "rational."37 Another argument might be made in 
opposition to the imposition of expatriation as punishment. Even assum-
ing that expatriation might achieve the ends of punishment, are there not 
"less drastic means" available, such as fines and imprisonment, to accom-
plish the same ends? It seems that the traditional modes of punishment 
can achieve equally well, if not better, any of the ends of punishment to 
which expatriation might be directed. If one is willing to concede that 
these traditional modes are "less drastic" than expatriation, the chances of 
expatriation being constitutionally imposed as punishment disappear. It 
should be noted that, outside of the provisions struck down in the prin-
35 Id. at 111. This of course is simply the "rational nexus" test applied specifically 
to Congress's power to set penalties for violations of federal law. See note 9 supra and 
accompanying text. 
36 "[I]t must be questioned whether expatriation can really achieve the • . . effects 
sought by society in punitive devices." Trop v. Dulles, &56 U.S. 86, 111-12 (1958) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring). 
37 Availability of more efficient and less objectionable alternative methods was one 
of the reasons for Mr. Justice Brennan's concurrence in Trop v. Dulles, supra note 36, 
at 114. 
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cipal case and in Trop, there are no other statutory provisions relating to 
expatriation which evince a primary purpose of punishment.3B 
It seems settled that Congress has the power, at least for some purposes, 
to effect involuntary expatriation. However, that power is fenced in by 
many limitations. The requirement that "less drastic means" be used if 
available will probably limit its use to situations wherein it is a unique 
solution. The uncertainty of the effects of expatriation on an individual 
and the availability of more efficient alternatives would suggest the inap-
propriateness of its use as a punishment. 
John W. Erickson 
38 See § 349(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 267-68, as 
amended, 68 Stat. 1146 (1954), 8 U.S.C. § 148l(a) (1958). Section 349(a)(9) provides for 
expatriation upon conviction for treason or upon conviction for conspiracy to over-
throw the government by force. This may appear to be punishment, but it can easily 
be construed to show lack of allegiance and thus be considered a voluntary abandonment 
of citizenship. See Note, 44 CoRNELL L.Q. 593, 598-99 (1959). 
